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ABSTRACT 
Government officials are looking to contracting out and privatization as means to 
create a public sector that works better and costs less. This new approach to public 
service delivery is evident in the welfare to work reforms of the 1990s, low- and 
moderate-income housing construction and management, homeless services, eco-
nomic development and job training, and the charter school movement. Contracted 
services require a whole new set of skills for government workers, including 
contract design, negotiation, monitoring, and evaluation. Sophisticated information 
systems are crucial to performance management and evaluation systems that are 
essential to effective contract management. This chapter explores the theory and 
practice of performance measurement and information technology (IT) in the 
context of outsourcing public service delivery. It discusses the use of government 
strategic planning and information-based performance management to plan and 
manage private contractors performing public tasks. While information systems are 
critical to the management of in-house organizational units, we believe they are 
even more important in managing the work of contractors. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Government officials are looking to contracting out and privatization as means to create a 
public sector that works better and costs less. This new approach to public service 
delivery is evident in the welfare to work reforms of the 1990s, low- and moderate-
income subsidized housing programs since the 1980s, homeless service programs, job 
training, the business improvement district initiative, and the charter school movement. 
Contracted services require government workers to develop a whole new set of skills, 
including contract design, negotiation, program monitoring, and evaluation. Sophisti-
cated information systems are also needed to provide the performance measures and 
evaluation programs that are essential to effective contract management. 
This chapter explores the theory and practice of performance management and 
information technology (IT) in the context of outsourcing public service delivery. It 
discusses the use of government strategic planning and information-based performance 
management to plan and manage private contractors performing public tasks. While 
information systems are critical to the management of in-house organizational activities 
and units, we believe they are even more important in managing the work of contractors. 
II. ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT 
A. The Influence of Changing Technology on Organizational Form and Function 
The need for vertically integrated, hierarchically controlled organizations has been 
reduced as technology has made it easier to communicate ideas and information and 
transport goods around the world (Cohen and Eimicke, 1998, 2002, 2003): satellite 
communication, cellular telephones, handheld computers, wireless Internet access, con-
tainerized shipping, and multinational organizational networks make it possible to create 
goods and services in a variety of locations. These goods and services can be assembled 
throughout the globe, from components made all over the world, and can be tailored for 
use in a particular location or market. 
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The creation of a worldwide system of production means that organizations must 
constantly ask and then reexamine the "make-or-buy decision." Should we do this task 
in-house or hire a consultant or another firm to do this work for us? The correct answer to 
this question is not necessarily to increase the amount of contracting out. In today's 
world, yesterday's decision to buy something can be today's decision to make it. Tech-
nology alone can change the basis for such a decision. Perhaps the most dramatic recent 
example of changing dynamics is the decision of the U.S. government to take airport 
security back from the private sector in the aftermath of terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001. Access to information about individuals and groups available only to public law 
enforcement instantaneously on a global basis is essential to airport security and cannot 
be shared with private vendors. In 2003 and 2004 the military discovered that some 
vendors refused to perform contracted tasks during the war with Iraq because they 
refused to put their workers in danger. The military discovered they could not outsource 
bravery - some functions such as food service and construction needed to remain in-
house if they were to be performed on or near a battlefield. The work that each 
organization does can change rapidly as do the organization's structures that support 
that work. 
Organizational form is therefore far less stable in well-managed organizations than it 
once was. Organizational function changes rapidly as well. There are three basic ques-
tions that organizations must ask: (1) What should we do? (2) How should we do it? and 
(3) Who should do it? In the past, these questions could be answered definitively and for 
a long period. Bureaucratic hierarchies and standard operating procedures could be built 
on the answers to these questions. Today, these questions must be raised constantly in a 
global struggle to keep current with technology and competition. 
Some might wonder who is government competing with? For the most part, govern-
ment has a monopoly, or at least a shared monopoly, with other levels of government 
within distinct functional areas. However, the best managers understand the importance 
of the cost of government as an element in a nation's (or region's) ability to have its goods 
and services compete in a global economy. Governments do not directly compete, but 
their cost, efficiency, and effectiveness affect a nation's or a region's economic well-
being. Therefore, well-managed organizations are always asking and responding in 
different ways to the aforementioned three questions. This means that organizational 
function and form are constantly in flux. 
8. Management Challenges Posed by Organizational Networks 
Although well-managed, dynamic organizations find themselves undergoing constant 
change, one factor does not change - the need for management direction and the 
demand for accountability. While mayors and commissioners might try to blame a bad 
result on an inadequate contractor, that argument is generally not accepted by the public 
- especially over the long term. When programs are implemented by a variety of 
organizations that form a network, issues of communication, coordination, and direction 
are generated. 
Organizations within the network need to learn what tasks they are to perform, when 
they should perform them, the objectives they are attempting to achieve, the customers 
they are being asked to serve, and the information they must provide to the agency they are 
working for. This requires extensive contact and information exchange. The agency 
contracting for the work does not perform the tasks in question, but it should determine 
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what tasks must be performed, by whom, at what time, and for what purpose. The agency 
must learn whether the tasks have been performed and what outputs and outcomes the 
tasks have generated. It must coordinate the actions of numerous contractors and, where 
contractors must interact, ensure that the interaction is working as designed. 
Organizational networks, when they run well, can be more efficient and effective 
than vertically integrated hierarchical organizations. However, they must be managed, 
and such management is not cost-free or easy. It requires a new type of management that 
relies on creativity and innovation to fuel new mechanisms for communicating to and 
influencing the behavior of external organizations. Often, contract instruments must be 
used to exercise influence: for example, linking payment schedules and bonuses to 
performance. To receive these incentives, vendors must perform in certain specific 
ways and they must also provide the lead agency with information on their performance. 
C. Performance Management 
A number of researchers have noted the trend over the past decade for state and local 
governments to contract out, or outsource a substantial number of the services previously 
delivered by civil servants to private and, particularly, nonprofit organizations (Butcher, 
1995; Forrest, 1995; Sclar, 2000; Cohen and Eimicke, 2002). Forrest 0995: 51) notes that 
agencies have thus been transformed "from direct providers to monitoring, regulation, 
and contract-enforcing agencies." He emphasizes the importance of new management 
skills necessary to guide these organizations that now have a networked contractor 
structure, rather than the traditional hierarchical service delivery structure. Forrest regards 
the increase in emphasis on performance monitoring as part of the process of contract 
specification and oversight necessary in these new structures. 
Martin and Kettner 0996) cover the process of performance measurement in human 
service agencies and programs in some depth. They define performance measurement as 
the regular collection and reporting of information about the efficiency (inputs/outputs), 
quality, and effectiveness (outcomes) of programs (p. 3). They argue the chief reason to 
adopt performance measurement in human services is to improve the management of 
those programs by supplying agencies with information about who their clients are; their 
demographic characteristics; their service requirements; the amount, quality, and level of 
service received; and the outcome of receiving the service. Performance measures keep 
managers informed about how their program is doing and assist in oversight. 
Performance measures may be used to monitor the delivery of contractors' services in 
the same way that they can be used to monitor agency performance. The advantage, 
according to Martin and Kettner 0996), is that once performance measures are in place, 
the agency can move to performance-based contracting, in which contractors are paid for 
meeting certain performance-based criteria. For example, payment to a job training and 
employment contractor is based on the number of people they actually place in a job, not 
on the number of people they are currently training. 
D. Performance Management and Contracting Out 
Management of interorganizational networks and contracts means that leaders cannot 
depend on traditional hierarchical controls to influence the behavior of subordinates who 
are responsible for performing particular tasks. This means that management cannot use 
organizational culture, personnel promotion, demotion, termination, or authoritative 
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command structures to influence behavior. In our view, many of these tools are of 
declining usefulness anyway. Given that public employees are entitled to due process 
rights, it is increasingly difficult to fire someone. In the professionalized environment 
characteristic of most government agencies, few professionals are responsive to direct 
command. They are more likely to behave as management requires in response to 
persuasion and positive incentives. Merit pay and other bonus systems can be effective 
in rewarding good performance, but few techniques are available to government to 
effectively punish poor performance. 
In contrast, contractual relationships with private and nonprofit firms provide the 
surest way to punish poor performance: contract termination. While there are limits to the 
use of this technique - it is difficult to terminate contracts in midterm - it does send a 
message that is clearly understood by the people who work in the organizations holding 
the contract. Competition and the intense work environment it engenders can be created 
through contracting. Systems can be established with competing vendors, and contracts 
can be signed with incentive and penalty clauses. When the term of the contract is over, 
new bids are sought and a poorly performing contractor can see the contract simply 
come to an end. In this sense the contractor has some of the same attributes as an 
employee on a renewable term appointment. 
One example of a contractual mechanism to enhance contractor performance was 
used in a New York City subway track repair project. The contractor renovating the tracks 
on the city's number 2 and 3 lines received a $30,000 bonus for each day the project was 
finished ahead of schedule (and could have been fined $30,000 for each day it was late). 
The project was completed about 3 weeks ahead of schedule and the contractor was paid 
a bonus of more than $600,000. To develop this incentive and disincentive clause in the 
contract the government needed to know: (1) a reasonable deadline; and (2) the 
appropriate level to set the reward/punishment. They also needed an operational defin-
ition of "complete project" to put in the contract. Finally, they needed to find a way to 
confirm when the project was completed. These extensive information requirements 
place new demands on government managers that must be addressed if the contract 
mechanism is to work. 
The challenge to management is to develop contract clauses that provide them with 
tools to influence the behavior of the organization under contract. It is also important to 
ensure that the vendor does not develop a monopoly over the function it is performing. If 
the contractor is the only organization capable of performing the task, threats of termin-
ation can be easily ignored. We have seen this result frequently in military procurement 
and ironically, in the purchase of IT hardware, software, and contracting services. In our 
view, functions that cannot generate competitive bids should be directly performed by 
government wherever feasible. If sole-source contracting is unavoidable, government 
managers must ensure that performance criteria are clear, well-publicized, easily meas-
ured, and understood, and that penalties for missing performance targets are severe. 
E. Performance Management and Information Needs 
Contract management requires that government receive timely, accurate information. 
When possible, contracts must be developed that require vendors to report input, 
process, output, and outcome measures on a frequent basis. However, self-reporting, 
while necessary, is not sufficient. When services are provided directly to the public, 
citizen service complaints and complements can serve as a useful barometer of contract 
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performance. It is also important to have all contract performance measures and payment 
generation actions verified and audited by third parties that are independent of the 
contractor. This can be done directly by a government agency's performance measure-
ment unit, or can be done under contract to a consulting firm, think tank, or university. 
Some members of a program's implementation network are organizations that are not 
under direct contract to the government. Examples of these actors include nonprofit 
organizations and private firms with a similar mission. The private insurers of underground 
oil and chemical storage tanks help the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) enforce 
tank standards, hut do not work for EPA. Recently, the insurance industry was credited by the 
federal government for the automobile industry voluntarily accelerating compliance with 
government requirements for passenger protections in the case of vehicle collisions. 
Similarly, a nonprofit organization that advocates for the government protection of 
abused children may also provide shelter for such children. The nonprofit is thereby part 
of a city's network for protecting and providing foster care for children, but they may not 
be a government contractor. In these cases, collection of important performance data 
may be difficult if not impossible. Despite these difficulties, information about perform-
ance must be collected if the government hopes to manage the program being imple-
mented by the interorganizational network. 
F. The Use of Performance Measurement Systems to Respond to Network 
Management Problems 
The managers of government programs that utilize networks of organizations to perform 
critical tasks must obtain information about the performance of these organizations if 
they are to effectively manage these programs. This requires strategic thinking about 
what information they need and how they might obtain that information. When dealing 
with private firms, government must overcome the issue of proprietary information. 
Some firms are reluctant to tell you what they are doing, as they consider their work 
processes and outputs to be part of the competitive edge they have over other organiza-
tions. If they are under contract to you, it is possible to use the contract as leverage to 
collect information. If the firm is simply in a related business to yours, information 
collection may be difficult, and may require substantial effort to obtain. 
However difficult collection of information might be, the key first step is to decide 
what information is needed. This should be guided by the management needs of the 
program. What is the definition of success? What direct or surrogate measures can be 
used to determine if progress is being made? The definition of success and the appro-
priateness of measures to that definition is critical. One cannot manage a program unless 
one can measure its performance. Without a way to measure performance you cannot tell 
if your actions are leading you toward or away from success. You have no way of 
knowing if you are moving forward or backward. 
Decisions on performance measures are critical management decisions. They are the 
ground-level, operational definition of policy. They provide real-world specificity to 
abstract ideas and policy and are therefore of great consequence. The information 
collected on performance must be an integral part of an agency's strategy for implement-
ing a program. If the goals of a program change, the measures must change as well. 
Once the information necessary to manage the program is known, a strategy is 
needed for collecting the information. A fundamental principle of management informa-
tion systems (MISs) is that people and organizations are more likely to provide accurate 
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information to a system if they utilize the data themselves and they see a benefit to 
cooperation. If the organizations providing information think its provision can help sell 
the program and help them obtain additional resources they will be more cooperative 
than if the data are used to monitor and punish poor performance. The problems of 
collecting timely, accurate information can be overcome if care and strategic thought are 
given to developing and maintaining the performance measurement system. Information 
retrieval is not an automatic, mechanical process. It is a political process requiring the 
buy-in of those providing information. 
Performance measurement is critical to overcoming the management challenges 
faced when using an interorganizational implementation network. The construction of 
a system of measurement is an important early task for a program's managers. It should 
not be off-loaded to a consulting firm or the organization's MIS shop. It is leaders that 
create partnerships and networks, not technical experts. As such, it should be treated as a 
subject worthy of formal negotiations and either a contractual agreement or a memoran-
dum of understanding (written or tacit) agreement. Below we discuss, in conceptual 
terms, the types of measures that should be included in these performance measurement 
agreements. 
G. Performance Measures and IT 
While the nature of the system being managed is a key issue in establishing methods of 
performance measurement, IT itself is an influence on the feasibility, timeliness, and 
accuracy of performance measurement systems. Computer, communication, and trans-
portation technology make it possible to implement public programs through interorga-
nizational networks. This same technology makes it possible to track and manage the 
work of these networks (Henderson, 2003). However, technology is never cost-free and 
new technology is never glitch-free. 
IT is crucial to the implementation of an effective performance management program 
(Carter, 1989; Cohen and Eimicke, 2002: 157-186) Technology must be accessible and 
user-friendly to ensure that data entry is accurate (Barrett and Greene, 2000). Turnaround 
of reports to management must also be rapid to ensure that indicators are available when 
management decisions are made (Buntin, 1999). 
Muid 0994) discusses issues in managing the vendors that provide IT services. A key 
issue is the development of sufficient in-house expertise to manage technically sophis-
ticated computer hardware, software, and management system vendors. Without suffi-
cient in-house expertise it is impossible for the government to be an intelligent consumer 
of IT and its related services. While IT capacity remains essential, it is also true that 
simple, off-the-shelf systems are increasingly available and capable of performing more 
functions. Even as state-of-the-art information systems become more and more complex 
and expensive the price of computing power and basic systems comes down. This means 
that even the smallest community-based nonprofit contractor can be asked to submit 
performance data electronically. As recently as 5 years ago this was not the case. 
Ill. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE 
Most performance measurement systems incorporate four types of measures - inputs, 
process, outputs, and outcomes. Traditional, budget-based performance measurement 
systems focus primarily on inputs: What are the resources available to address the priority 
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problems faced by the organization? Input measures are relatively easy to identify and 
collect. Commonly used input measures include dollars appropriated, person-hours 
committed, equipment purchased, space provided, and the length of time committed 
to the problem or the project. Less common but other very relevant input indicators are: 
other funds/other organizations involved or leveraged as a result of the initial organiza-
tion's actions or decisions; capital funds directly or indirectly committed as a by-product 
of the operating budget commitment; and external staff and consultant time dedicated to 
the preparation, operation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program being launched. 
Input measures are frequently criticized because they tell you only how hard you are 
trying to do something about a problem or the extent of your commitment to reach a 
particular goal (e.g., how much are we willing to spend to find a cure for AIDS?). Input 
measures tell you very little about how well you are doing in reaching the objective -
they measure effort much better than they assess results. But input measures should not 
be ignored. They provide an important barometer of the scope of activity, the present 
and future demand on overall resources, serve as surrogates of the organization's prior-
ities, and often reflect the organization's customer preferences as well. 
The process of producing work is an increasing focus of performance management 
systems and indicators. Total quality management's lasting contribution to management 
practice may be its attention to the work steps involved in producing goods and services. 
Measurement of these activities facilitates organizational learning and improvement. 
Process measures include the delineation and definition of specific work steps, measures 
of the amount of time it takes to perform specific tasks, error rates, and similar indicators. 
Requiring organizational units to report process measures can signal government's 
concern for the quality and efficiency of an organization's internal operations and can 
compel attention to these fundamental management issues. 
Output measures are the third type of performance measurement indicators. Output 
measures seek to quantify the amount of work accomplished with the input/resources 
provided. Output measures can seek to measure quantity, quality, or both aspects of the 
work performed. Typical output measures include: customers/clients served; facility 
condition and cleanliness; miles of road paved; numbers of applicants trained; tons of 
garbage collected; wages earned; course work completed; certificates or licenses ac-
quired; or number of products sold. In simple terms, output measures gauge the volume 
of activity generated by inputs. As with input measures, some outputs are more important 
than others. Utilizing a select number of indicators that have a direct impact on perform-
ance (particularly for customers and funding agencies) leads to a successful performance 
measurement system. 
Since World War II, most successful performance measurement systems have been 
output-based. However, in the 1990s, many experts have written about the weaknesses 
inherent in output-based systems. Output systems tend to measure and reward work 
accomplished on a milestone basis. For example, interim payments are doled out as a 
contractor achieves preestablished targets along the way toward a completed assignment 
or full service to a customer. 
On the surface, output measures seem to provide exactly what senior management 
should want - simple categories designed to encourage staff to accomplish the work 
desired by paying for milestones actually achieved. The key weakness of an output-based 
system is that it often "pays" more for the process toward the desired outcome than the 
outcome itself. The ultimate objective ends up being underemphasized. For example, in the 
welfare to work reform efforts over the past decade, we found that by the time employment 
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and training programs are paid for outputs, such as training, certification, resume prepar-
ation, and job interviews, only a small percentage of the contract amount remains to reward 
the contractor for actually placing clients in a job, keeping them employed, or assisting them 
up the employment ladder (Cohen and Eimicke, 1996, 1998, 1999). 
This leads us to outcome or impact measures. Performance measurement experts are 
seeking to tie input and output measures to more meaningful program impacts and goal 
achievement (Eisenberg, 2003; Kaestner et al., 2003). For example, the performance of a 
police department is not best measured by the number of officers on the payroll (input), 
how many people are arrested (output), or even the reduction in the overall crime rate 
(output), but rather how safe people feel and how safe they actually are (outcome). In 
New York City, a private think tank has constructed a "Quality of Life" index to measure 
the overall performance of its hometown city government (McMahon, 2003). 
An initial review might lead to the conclusion that properly designed outcome indicators 
are all a good performance management system requires. In practice, outcome measures 
have significant weaknesses. First, outcome data are usually the most difficult to identify and 
expensive to collect. Frederickson (2000) argues that because performance measures are 
quantitative representations of some reality, they are necessarily never as neutral and 
objective as they are presented. Rather, program supporters will use the same measures as 
program critics to come up with diametrically opposite conclusions regarding the efficacy of 
the initiative. In Washington, D. C., Mayor Anthony Willliams initiated an extensive system of 
agency scorecards that even cynics agreed produced positive results. However, with per-
sistent problems, such as unsafe streets, high homicide rates, and poorly performing 
schools, critics questioned the importance of the scorecard improvements (Scott, 2002). 
Second, outcomes are ongoing and the long-term impacts, both positive and negative, 
often do not evolve quickly. So, while in theory outcome measures are supposed to 
measure long-term impact, annual budget cycles and biennial elections often lead to very 
short-term definitions oflong term. Third, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to determine 
the independent effect of a program or government activity on a particular outcome 
(Eisenberg, 2003). Fourth, even outcome measures fail to answer the question of maximum 
potential - "How well are we doing? Compared with what?" Some sort of comparative 
benchmarking exercise is required to assess how well a program or organization is 
performing compared with other entities doing similar work (Morley et al., 2001). 
Finally, in the early 1990s, creators of the so-called balanced scorecard argued that 
existing performance management systems were far too limited and failed to adequately 
account for the need for continuous improvement, innovation, and the needs and wants 
of customers (Kaplan and Norton, 1991, 1993, 1996; Kaplan, 2002). The balanced score-
card sets goals and measures from four perspectives - financial, internal business 
operations, innovation and learning, and customers. The challenge for managers is 
how to create a set of measures that is comprehensive and still limited enough to focus 
the organization on what is most important. 
IV. CASE STUDIES OF EFFORTS TO UTILIZE PERFORMANCE 
MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS TO MANAGE CONTRACTED OPERATIONS 
A. New York City Department of Par'ks and Recreation 
The New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) maintains a municipal park 
system of more than 28,600 acres, including approximately 1500 parks, 950 playgrounds, 
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800 athletic fields, 570 tennis courts, 63 swimming pools, 14 miles of beaches, 36 recreation 
centers, 13 golf courses, 6 ice rinks, 9 nature centers, 4 zoos, 4 major stadia, and 2000 
"greenstreets." DPR also manages 22 house museums, 1100 monuments and markers, and 
2.5 million trees. 
Since 1984, DPR has made extensive use of performance measurement to achieve its core 
mission to "maintain a green, clean and safe park system for all New Yorkers." Over the past 
two decades, parks have used a variety of measures to measure their performance, including 
the number of crews conducting park cleanups, the number of park benches and playgrounds 
renovated, and the public's satisfaction with the city's parks (as measured by a random sample 
of park users). The DPR has also collected two sets of outcome data on the overall condition 
and cleanliness ofan ever-larger number of its park facilities and playgrounds. While the DPR's 
performance measurement system, known as the Parks Inspection Program (PIP), was and is 
not specifically designed for measuring contractor performance, it is used citywide to measure 
the performance of both governmental and nongovernmental organizations involved in the 
maintenance and management of DPR properties. 
The DPR has dramatically increased its use of contractors over the past decade. 
Through "requirements contracts," it uses private firms to replace playgrounds, fences, 
and park benches throughout the city's park system. Under these contracts, vendors bid 
to replace a specific number of facilities in a given period. They do not know in advance 
where they will be asked to work and are called on during the time the contract is in 
effect by parks management to install facilities in particular places. The DPR has also 
turned over day-to-day management of several parks to nonprofit organizations. Two of 
the city's most famous parks, Bryant Park and Central Park, are managed by nonprofit 
organizations. As contracting increases, the DPR's performance measurement system has 
become a critical tool of program management. 
1. Measuring park outcomes: objective indicators 
A key strategy utilized by New York City Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe is the use of 
park inspections to increase the day-to-day accountability of on-site park managers. 
Similar to the Compstat program utilized by the New York Police Department (NYPD) 
to achieve dramatic reductions in crime (Buntin, 1999), Parks Commissioner Benepe 
consults parks inspection data to target problems and to direct the activities of his staff. 
Trained inspectors from DPR's division of Operations and Management Planning used 
handheld computers and digital cameras to perform 4949 inspections in fiscal 2002-2003. 
The expansion of the Parks Inspection Program became feasible through the use of 
handheld computers to record inspection data. These handheld computers, which in-
spectors utilize during on-site inspections, facilitate the swift compilation of inspection 
results. In 1992, 1993, and 1994 combined, 1400 park inspections were filed on paper and 
later manually entered into the program's database. With the introduction of direct data 
entry of inspector reports into handheld computers, the 1995 inspection total reached 
2000 and has accelerated to the current year total by 600 inspections, as parks staff 
completed 2000 inspections that year alone. 
The increased use of performance data remains an operational imperative at DPR. 
Every inspected park, playground, and "greenstreet" is given an overall rating of "Accept-
able" or "Unacceptable" for overall condition and for cleanliness. The overall ratings are 
the composite of as many as 16 separate park features. Some additional park elements are 
inspected and tracked but do not figure into the overall rating of a site. Hazards are noted as 
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needing "Immediate Attention" and must be corrected with two inspection rounds follow-
ing its issuance. An immediate attention finding can fail a feature or even an entire site. 
Inspections occur in 2-week cycles, with 205 sites selected at random. Park managers 
do not receive advance warning about inspections. Results of the inspections are pre-
sented to the commissioner, deputy commissioners, and borough commissioners at 
regular senior-staff meetings. The results are also posted on a bulletin board located 
outside the parks commissioner's office. 
Site managers of inspected parks also receive inspection data on a regular basis. In 
addition to the general inspection rating, park managers get detailed lists of deficiencies 
and Polaroid photographs of their site taken at the time of the inspection. The inspection 
report also assesses the seriousness of each deficiency and advises what corrective action 
is required. 
The program also has a built-in method for correcting maintenance and cleanliness 
problems. Any unacceptable measures from the original inspection are reinspected after 
8 weeks. The results of these second inspections are presented to the first deputy 
commissioner and Commissioner Stern. The first deputy commissioner's staff independ-
ently track deficiencies involving potential safety hazards. 
2. Measuring park outcomes: subjective indicators 
An important step in the measurement of DPR's performance was the development of 
outcome measures. The views of park users are a critical measure of departmental per-
formance. While it can be argued that understanding the views of nonusers is also 
important, if the focus of the measure is improving the facility itself, the users of those 
facilities are the best judges of their subjective quality. While customer surveys are not a 
regular element of the department's performance measurement system, DPR seeks infor-
mation on customer satisfaction when it is available, affordable, and verifiable. So, during 
the summers of 1996 and 1997, the DPR cooperated with a pilot test and a full-scale survey 
of park users as a means of enhancing the performance measurement system. 
A team from Columbia University and the New York City Parks Council conducted 
random surveys of 374 park users in ten New York City parks in the summer of 1996. In 
the summer of 1997 a full-scale random sample survey of 1086 park users in 19 parks was 
completed. The survey data indicated that the public is generally satisfied with the quality 
of New York City parks. In the survey we conducted in 1997, nearly 76% of park users 
rated the quality of the park that they were visiting as either good or excellent. Most park 
users were reasonably satisfied with the parks; the most common response to our 
question asking respondents to rate the park they were visiting was good (50%). 
Central Park received the highest rating of any park. No one rated it poor, and half of 
those interviewed in the park gave it a rating of excellent (this park is managed under 
contract with a private, nonprofit organization, The Central Park Conservancy). Only one 
other park (Clove Lake) was rated excellent by a majority of its visitors. 
If we combine ratings of good and excellent as positive ratings and fair and poor as 
negative ratings, 18 of the 19 parks surveyed were perceived positively by their users. 
This included 14 parks viewed positively by 70% or more of those interviewed. Park users 
were satisfied with their parks in both high- and low-income neighborhoods. In parks 
neighboring lower-income census tracks, 71 % were rated good or excellent. While this is 
slightly lower than the 79% positive rating given to parks in higher-income areas, it is 
notable that this positive rating of parks was universal throughout the city. 
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Recently, New York City established a citywide 311 Information Call Line to handle 
citizen inquiries, requests, and complaints and free its 911 Emergency Line for true 
emergencies. An unexpected benefit of the 311 Citizen Service Center is that it provides 
continuous public feedback on how well city agencies such as DPR are meeting the 
needs of the citizens, as citizens see those needs. Beginning in fiscal 2002-2003, the New 
York City Mayor's Management Report includes 311 data for every agency. 
For the first period for which 311 data were available (March through June 2003), the 
311 Citizen Service Center received 8769 DPR inquiries. Among the top five categories of 
inquiries for DPR, three related to emergency tree/branch removal or dead tree removal 
(17.8% of all inquiries), about 10% represented general information requests, and 7% 
concerned information on DPR special entertainment events. 
3. Impact of the outcome measures 
The Parks Inspection Program has evolved into a highly effective performance manage-
ment tool for DPR. The inspections inform park managers about what operational areas 
require improvement and establish their maintenance priorities. The program also 
provides site managers with performance incentives. Ultimately, inspection results help 
assess the effectiveness of park managers, borough offices, and the contractors they 
manage. Park managers and their vendors compete with one another for ratings and 
ratings improvements, and the five boroughs compete to have the best-maintained parks. 
Perhaps most importantly, the inspection program communicates the park's quality 
standards to park personnel and contractors and evaluates how well they uphold these 
quality standards. 
Citywide, overall condition ratings increased from 39% acceptable in the spring of 
1994 to 43% acceptable in the spring of 1995. They improved again to 690/o acceptable in 
the spring of 1997 and 80% in the spring of 1998. Since then, overall acceptable ratings 
have been no lower than 85% and reached 87% for 2003. Despite these excellent results, 
like many performance measurement systems, PIP could itself be improved, and over the 
past several years the authors have worked with the New York City Parks Council and 
the Parks Department to do so. DPR has also aggressively pursued expansion of the PIP 
to new areas by raising its own performance targets. 
The inspection system is conducted at the places used most frequently by park users. 
These sites only comprise a relatively small percentage of the system's total acreage of 
28,600 acres. Natural areas, trails, ball fields, and other less utilized facilities were not 
inspected. In the summer of 1998, we worked with the New York City Parks Council and 
the Parks Department to develop a methodology for inspecting these other park re-
sources and conducted a pilot test of the new system. We found that 56% of the facilities 
we inspected were of acceptable quality, as compared with 80% in the areas of the park 
that were traditionally inspected. We also found that personnel resources tended to be 
allocated to the areas that were inspected. Both these findings demonstrated the impact 
of performance measurement on management decision-making and organizational per-
formance. Inspected facilities got more personnel and were in better shape. 
Despite our own work in developing subjective outcome measures, there is little 
question that the most important performance measures are those output data on 
condition and cleanliness that the DPR collects regularly. They provide a check on all 
contracted and government-performed activities and have a direct impact on manage-
ment decisions. In addition, the system has led to tangible improvements in the quality 
and condition of the most heavily utilized park facilities. 
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B. New York City Department of Homeless Services 
The New York City Department of Homeless Services (OHS) provides and oversees the 
provision of shelter-based services to homeless people in New York City. The population 
served consists of both single individuals and families, so a variety of services are offered 
through different types of shelters. Three broad categories of shelter reflect a continuum 
of care: (1) basic drop-in shelters without beds that provide shelter for a night and 
minimal counseling services; (2) more structured shelter programs providing beds, 
counseling, and referral services; and (3) single-resident occupant (SRO) and commercial 
hotels providing a more independent experience of living. The OHS seeks to move its 
clients through this continuum of care, with the ultimate aim of moving them into their 
own public or private housing (Cohen and Eimicke, 1995). 
When Mayor Michael Bloomberg appointed Linda Gibbs to become the commis-
sioner of OHS, she was aware that she was inheriting a department that was in transition 
and still struggling to deal with its prime objective - alleviating the levels of homeless-
ness in New York City. When Gibbs ended up taking office in January 2002, the rate of 
homelessness in New York City was at an all-time high, as more than 30,000 men, 
women, and children were in shelters. The rising cost of housing, coupled with the 
unemployment in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, were the main causes of 
this. It did not help that New York City itself was in an economic recession, thereby 
subjecting every city agency to massive budget cuts. 
Out of all those who were homeless, the largest subdivision was composed of 
homeless families. While New York was scrambling to find solutions to this problem, 
the number of homeless families was rising while the housing facilities in which they 
were to live were filling up. Rather than being in the shelter system for a short period of 
time before moving on to some sort of permanent housing, homeless families were now 
facing stays of up to 10.5 months in the system. It cost the city an average of $28,657 per 
year for each family in the system, whereas if they were put into permanent housing, the 
annual housing subsidy provided by the city would be $12,000. Rather than depleting the 
DHS of its already stringent budget, Gibbs determined to help solve this problem in a way 
that would rapidly increase the number of permanent housing facilities for the city's 
homeless families and at the same time tackle the problem of homelessness. What she 
proposed was the Performance Investment Program (PIP), which would reward non-
profit city contractors for the number of people moved out of homelessness into per-
manent housing. Gibbs hoped that this system would expedite the permanent housing 
opportunities available to homeless families. 
1. The Performance Investment Program1 
The OHS was created under Mayor David Dinkins, and showed results before being 
severely curtailed by the administration of Mayor Rudolph Guiliani. During Guiliani's 
tenure, the department suffered budget reductions and a policy created by the Guiliani 
Administration that tried to discourage homeless people from requesting city services. 
However, a major facet of the OHS that Guiliani did carry on from the era of Dinkins 
1 This section of the chapter is based in part on original research conducted by Columbia University 
MPA students. See "New York City Department of Homeless Services: A Comprehensive Case Study of 
the Performance Investment Program (PIP)" by Diana Glanternik, Dana Krieger, Amy Shefrin, and Hong 
Yin, Unpublished Manuscript, December, 2003. 
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was to continue the process of privatizing homeless shelters through the use of 
nonprofit vendors. The city actively pursued a contracting strategy which resulted in a 
system of increasingly cost-effective service delivery. The goal of the Performance 
Investment Program (PIP) was to add a performance-based element to this contracting 
process. 
The PIP pilot program began in June 2002. It was to be based on two main factors -
housing targets and result cards. Housing targets were assigned to shelter providers, with 
the targets based on historic statistics compiled by policy analysts at OHS. The agency's 
annual target was to move a total of 9250 families into permanent housing. The result 
cards were used to measure each shelter's population and performance data. Overall, the 
goal of PIP was to move more homeless families into homes. Once evaluations were 
completed, each shelter would be given a grade out of a maximum of 100 to determine 
whether they would receive bonuses based on their performance. If they failed to reach 
their target they would be penalized. Such an incentive helped to rally the shelters to 
increase the number of homeless families they placed into homes, as it would benefit the 
shelters as well as the city. 
Result cards were issued monthly. They reflected each shelter's population and rele-
vant statistics. The way in which OHS tracked each client's basic identifying information 
was through its main computer database, the Client Tracking System (CTS). Once a client 
was input into DHS's system, OHS would search for that name in the Human Resources 
Administration's (HRA) database to find out whether the client received public assistance. 
However, the system contained some level of inaccurate data. DHS began to work with 
shelter providers every month to identify discrepancies between data sets and to verify 
correct information. The CTS would then be updated. PIP forced the agency to better 
ensure the accuracy of its data, and to reconcile it with that of the shelter providers. 
Although the main goal of PIP was specifically geared toward getting housing for 
families, it functioned as a tool to improve OHS as a whole. It made the shelters 
accountable for their clients through housing targets and result cards. These helped 
OHS focus on the common goal of permanent housing. The development of a hard-
data, performance-based system helped to dramatically improve the services offered by 
shelters as well as the overall way in which the OHS functioned. Constant evaluation 
helped OHS to gauge what measures needed to be implemented in order to fix specific 
problems. Placement rates had reached a low of 2943 in 2001 and 3531 in fiscal 2002 but 
with PIP, 5289 families were placed in permanent housing in 2003 (OHS website, Office 
of Policy and Planning). While this still fell short of the goal of 9250, it demonstrated a 
remarkable turnaround and highlighted the fact that a program of strategic planning 
coupled with performance-based contracting could be effective. 
2. Analysis 
The case of homeless services in New York City indicates the importance of strategic 
thinking when contracting services. OHS set a clear strategic goal of placing homeless 
people into permanent housing. They worked with their contractors to focus 
their attention on the ultimate goal of moving people out of the homeless system. As a 
result, we see dramatic improvement in outputs from 2001 to 2003 The small improve-
ment from 2001 to 2002 is greatly accelerated in 2003. While we do not have definitive 
proof that this is a result of PIP, it is difficult to see what else would have caused this 
change. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
The two local government agencies discussed in this chapter have begun the process of 
measuring the performance of services delivered with the assistance of contractors. In the 
case of the New York City DPR, this effort is simply folded into their overall performance 
measurement system. In the case of the DHS, it focused on a performance-based reward 
system that required contractors to provide data and evidence of goal-oriented perform-
ance. 
What is striking about these cases is the degree to which computer-based information 
systems are now fully integrated into the standard operating procedures of these muni-
cipal agencies. Even paper forms are now e-mailed and the use of standard spreadsheets 
that are easily downloaded into off-the-shelf data systems has significantly reduced the 
costs of collecting, reporting, and analyzing data. Performance data are now routinely 
and rapidly collected from vendors and when connected to a tangible reward system are 
considered a central tool of contractor management. 
Performance is measured and incentives are beginning to be based on the reports of 
performance. In the case of community-based, nonprofit organizations, the issue of staff 
capacity and resources used to limit the ability of government to require participation in a 
particular electronic performance measurement system. Today, those limits have virtually 
disappeared in even the smallest nonprofit organization. 
As the technology of personal computers, networked both locally and through the 
Internet, expanded through society, ease of access to these systems had made their use 
more commonplace. It is increasingly easy to construct performance measurement 
systems that connect and track the accomplishment of all the organizations involved in 
implementing a particular program. This in turn has increased the tendency for organ-
izational networks to be constructed to deliver services such as parks and homeless 
services in New York City. 
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